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Ending Sykes-Picot:   
The Arab World and the West After 2011 
 
 
Robert Bowker 
 
 
Introduction  
Amidst ongoing instability in the post-2011 Arab political, economic and social environment, 
accelerated in many cases by the weakening of the authority of the state – and in some cases by 
the removal or terminal decline of regimes – fundamental issues about what it means to be 
Arab and modern in the post-colonial Arab order are in dispute.  
 
The driving forces of change – demographic pressures, education, connectivity, unemployment 
and other frustrations and indignities – continue to fracture most Middle East Arab societies in 
complex ways, while the core political, judicial and economic institutions created by 
modernising rulers since the 19th century (in the case of Egypt) and in the colonial and early 
post-colonial era mostly remain in place. In Egypt and some other non-oil exporting Arab 
countries an amorphous desire to widen space for political and cultural expression was met by 
hard-edged determination to secure the success of an ill-defined and largely unarticulated 
Islamist vision. While initially it enjoyed political ascendancy 1  the Islamist trend has 
subsequently encountered major challenges to its authority and political legitimacy.  
 
The debate about what it means to be both Arab and modern now mostly pits multiple 
versions of an Islamic discourse against an equally reductive discourse which is secular in spirit, 
and which is deeply antagonised by what it believes the Islamist ‘other’ represents. Among 
Islamists it contrasts inclusive thinking against neo-traditional, exclusivist notions of what the 
faith requires of its adherents. There is no consensus about the role of the state in responding 
to patterns of behaviour judged to be at odds with the values of Islam in either its modernist 
interpretation or its neo-traditional forms. Generational gaps and power struggles, leftist and 
Islamist notions of social justice competing with advocacy of welfare through business-led 
economic growth, and as yet unresolved questions of transitional justice add further political 
and ideological complications to the debate.  
 
The opposition previously faced by Arab elites and leaderships that inherited the power once 
enjoyed by colonial regimes (including in some cases the legislative means through which that 
power was given effect) was mostly either nationalist, leftist or Islamist. The picture now is more 
anarchic. There is a powerful sense of disconnection and frustration, alienation and 
marginalization from politics and decision-making not only at the government level but across 
society in general.2 On the Islamist side of the spectrum – broadly speaking, those who engage 
in politics according to an Islamic discourse – the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood-led 
government of Mohammed Morsy has raised serious questions about the capacity of Arab 
political systems to contain, through constitutional means, the struggle between Islamists and 
those who reject the use of Islamic discourse and lifestyles in defining their identities.3 The 
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rivets of Arab society have visibly loosened, with the fading of government authority in the face 
of street-level challenges ranging from football ‘ultras’ to lynch mobs.  
Robert Kaplan’s observation in 2011 that it “is less democracy than the crisis of central 
authority that will dominate the next phase of Middle Eastern history”4 seems increasingly apt. 
Rhetoric aside, this is not a struggle for democracy: it is mainly about the future of power 
structures and the places of political Islam and the military, brought on by a popular convulsion, 
in Egypt at least, at the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood to take a genuinely inclusive 
approach to government, and a refusal of the non-Islamist side of the political spectrum to 
accept the prospect of Islamist rule. Military intervention is unlikely to address any of those 
problems, let alone resolve them. It is a grim situation, fed by economic stress, with potential to 
grow worse. 
 
If the shadow of the future now hangs over much of the Arab world it is largely because of the 
failure of key institutions: government, family structures, education systems, business networks 
and other bastions of privilege to change fast enough to meet the demands of an increasingly 
articulate, educated, globally-connected, mobilised younger generation of Arab activists.5 The 
contest which has followed is the inevitable outcome of that failure. It is a debate about values 
and power, full of fury, chicanery, suspicion and fear.  
 
Because it is bounded only weakly by the uncodified norms of traditional or conventional Arab 
political behaviour, rather than by credible, institutionally-based political processes, and 
perhaps also because it is taking place in a climate of increasing economic insecurity, the debate 
about the future of Arab society is contributing to the destruction of the social fabric. It is fed to 
some extent by developments beyond national borders, especially the sectarian bloodshed in 
Syria and the contest in that country between regional powers.  
 
Sunni-Shia antagonism has risen to unprecedented heights across the region. The civil war in 
Syria combines carnage of civilians and the destruction of the core elements of Syrian society 
and the state itself. It will take at least a generation to restore some sort of normality to a very 
different Syria, with its youth brutalised, sharper sectarianism, smaller minority communities 
and a greatly reduced middle class. The Kurds of Iraq see a future pregnant with national 
possibilities, while violence elsewhere between the Shia and Sunni has returned to levels not 
seen since 2007. Jordan and Lebanon are under pressure from both the influx of refugees from 
Syria. The Syrian conflict may lead to a renewal of conflict between confessional groups within 
Lebanon itself. Egypt has rarely been more fragile, economically and politically. 
 
Against that background, this paper seeks to examine the durability of the foundations of much 
of the contemporary Middle East, from three perspectives: national or territorial sovereignty, 
political values and cultural expression. These issues fall, directly or indirectly, within the 
framework of what has often been referred to as ‘Sykes-Picot’: the agreement§ reached between 
                                                
§ Barr notes that the agreement was not seen by the British as a blueprint for the future government of the region 
but rather as a ‘hypothetical exercise’ intended to resolve problems with their French allies. The deal, which 
concerned territory that neither signatory controlled, was “vulnerable to events” (Barr, p. 36). The practical 
effect of the agreement was largely overtaken by later negotiations and territorial tradeoffs, agreed between 
London and Paris and ultimately endorsed by the League of Nations. Nevertheless, it was “even by the standards 
of the time… a shamelessly self-interested pact, reached well after the point when a growing number of people 
had started to blame empire-building for the … war” (Barr, p. 32). More importantly, from an Arab perspective, 
it also contradicted the undertakings previously provided by the British to the Hashemite leader Hussein bin Ali, 
or Hussein’s understanding of those undertakings, in regard to his ambition after the war to rule Syria and Iraq. 
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Britain and France in January 1916, and with Tzarist Russia in May 1916, which envisioned a 
post-war division of the Arab remnants of the Ottoman Empire between them.6  A further aim 
of the paper, in the light of the above, is to examine the implications of Sykes-Picot for 
Western interests in the Arab world, and the question of how closure might be brought to the 
issue as a shaping factor in the relations between Arab governments and society and their 
Western counterparts. 
 
While reports of its passing are in vogue7 it is probably more instructive to ask why Sykes-Picot 
has taken almost a century to die. The answer lies in the fact that the agreement was always 
more than a matter of diplomatic history or geopolitics. It represented an era when imperial 
values existed alongside national aspirations; when subject populations were both coerced and 
coopted into national frameworks which were based on fundamentally unequal and often 
conflictual dealings with external powers. But it was also an era which saw the transmission and 
migration of a range of non-traditional, modernising capabilities and values from the Western 
powers into Arab societies.  
 
In other words, Sykes-Picot represents a process, as well as an historical event. And both the 
agreement itself – in terms of its ultimate impact on state sovereignty – and the contemporary 
consequences of the process in terms of the unfolding of Arab political values and culture 
continue to reverberate within Arab societies, helping to shape the relationship between state 
and society in the Arab context.  
 
Strong Societ ies and Weak States Paradigm Revisi ted 
 
It was once fashionable to focus on the power of primordial loyalties and beliefs in Arab 
societies and the struggle facing governments seeking to impose institutional discipline and 
political order upon those unstable foundations. Arab nations were ‘tribes with flags’.8 Strong 
societies were contrasted with weak states.9 Albert Hourani underscored the importance of 
power, obligation (asabiyya) and collective identity in Arab political culture and society.10 Many 
pondered upon the problematic association, real or perceived, between diverse notions of Arab 
society, Islam, democracy and modernity. 11  Still others focussed on the resilience of 
authoritarianism amid the politics of reform.12   
 
In a narrow sense, states were stronger than they looked. Their authority evolved due to the 
cumulative impact of nation-building institutions ranging from education systems to anthems 
and football teams to the remorseless propaganda surrounding leaderships. States at times were 
frighteningly violent towards their citizens: recourse to coercion was always available where 
persuasion and deal-making failed to suffice to meet the state’s purposes. Authoritarian rulers 
had control over the resources of the state. The state (or in practice, the ruler and those closest 
to him) not the tribe, was ultimately the arbiter of policies.  
 
Cooptation often worked well for leaders, especially with minority groups and other elements 
which chose to cast their lot with the regime in return for privileged access to opportunities. 
The state, not the society, was at the forefront of creating role models and success stories for a 
younger generation to respect and perhaps emulate. Some negotiation between states and non-
state actors was inevitable, but with a few exceptions (as in Lebanon, where confessional 
arrangements provided the basis of the state itself) the temptation for those who saw themselves 
as upwardly mobile was mostly to accommodate to the state and the power of its leader, not 
vice versa.  
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From such limited and coercive beginnings, the political authority of Arab leaderships grew to 
represent, to much of their own populations at least, the expression of a new and attractive 
form of Arab modernity. For all their shortcomings, Arab leaders from Gamal Abdel Nasser to 
Saddam Hussein provided an affirmation of collective dignity of a higher order than tribal 
affiliation. Primordial loyalties, in contrast, provided only a limited basis for dealing effectively 
with the demands of the modern world. 
 
The strength of states formed in the dying days of the colonial era was ultimately, however, a 
mirage. It lay in the power accrued by leaders rather than institutions. Where leaders 
introduced progressive reforms in such areas as personal status, and quota-based parliamentary 
representation for women and minorities, those reforms were not driven by a sense of popular 
empowerment or collective will.13 Civil society was kept politically ineffectual. The values of 
constitutionalism were subsumed in a drive for power to give effect to a national vision held by 
the leadership rather than society as a whole.  
 
The ascendancy of the authoritarian state over Arab society also widened the gulf between their 
expectations of each other. Economic reform promoted macroeconomic stability at the 
expense of inclusive growth.14  Modernisers within Arab leaderships began to reshape the 
processes of government, especially in the economic sphere, but not its values.15 Corruption 
flourished and accountability remained limited. Reforms that generated economic growth 
advantaged the already privileged.16   
 
Especially in the decade before the Arab uprisings, Arab intellectuals called for popular 
empowerment as a means of fixing the shortcomings of manmade institutions.17 Regimes chose 
not to listen. Modernisation was envisaged among leaders: democratisation was not.18 Some 
leaders shamelessly distorted the functional effect of steps suggesting political reform so as to 
reaffirm their own control. While uncomfortable with this direction of events, Western 
governments accorded priority – and more importantly, were perceived to accord priority – to 
their security interests in their dealings with the leaders concerned.  
 
Ultimately, in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria the result was the calcification of regimes and a 
loss of authority and political legitimacy, not only for the leader but also for the system as a 
whole. The state had weakened without the emergence of a clear-cut alternative. Leaderships 
and their enabling systems were challenged, including in some cases by judiciaries previously 
under leadership control. In most cases, the institutions of the state remained formally in place 
but their role had been compromised.  
 
Like the regimes themselves, organized opposition forces had not been prepared for the 
convulsion of nebulous popular forces which overtook the region in 2011. Where regimes fell 
or were severely weakened, and especially where regimes turned to violence in their attempts to 
preserve themselves, the stronger became the appeal of primordial values, expressed through 
families, tribes, religious and other affiliations, and militias.  
 
One direct legacy of that experience was the consolidation of a significantly deepened, and 
enduring, challenge to the authority of the state, at precisely the moment when leadership by 
the core institutions of the state was most sorely needed. Politicians, judiciaries, parliaments, 
constitutions, security services, police, business systems and civil society forces now face the 
challenge of rebuilding their credibility among populations whose confidence in and respect for 
many such institutions has been severely damaged.  
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The revision of constitutional arrangements has seen fierce debate over whether the 
establishment of precedent through the rulings of Islamic courts, rather than the general 
principles of sharia should provide the basis for law.19 There are serious concerns about the 
prospect of ideologically-driven regulation of cultural expression and other individual freedoms. 
Secular tertiary institutions are under heightened pressure from salafist groups.20 Restrictions, 
enshrined in legislation, are being laid down on the role of non-government organisations, 
especially where they have links to external bodies.21  In many cases the institutions themselves 
are likely to be refurbished or redirected according to the preferences and vision of whoever 
finally emerges victorious from political contests.  
 
This complex of political, social and security issues has profound implications for the 
sovereignty, long-standing values and political direction of those Arab countries whose borders, 
and whose structures of government, were created in a very different era.  
 
The End of Sykes-Picot Era Sovereignty? 
 
Despite their unprepossessing origins in deals struck between London and Paris, where British 
and French officials drew the borders of Syria and Palestine, or where British officials 
negotiated and enforced treaties with rival Arab forces in the early 1920s, in most cases those 
border arrangements, when finalised, proved remarkably enduring. Competing dynastic claims, 
rivalries and suspicions; squabbles about territory among the Persian Gulf Arab states; the 
historical connections between such urban centres as Aleppo in Syria and Mosul in Iraq, and a 
multitude of tribal connections across borders had little overall effect on formal dealings 
between the governments that emerged in the colonial period.  
 
The domination of colonial powers also provided the means to subsume or force distinct 
historical and territorial divisions into modern states. In Iraq, the British created a state from 
three complex, historically distinct entities, and placed a Sunni minority and Hashemite 
leadership of their expedient choice in political control. Nevertheless, despite (or some would 
suggest, because of) the ruthless application of state coercion against elements among its own 
citizens, and the “exacerbation and recreation of ethnic and communal divisions as a strategy of 
rule”22 the idea, and, the performance of the state proved sustainable long after the British 
departed and the monarchy was overthrown. In Syria, the French quelled nationalist and Druze 
uprisings, and laid the basis for what was to become an Alawite minority-dominated 
government under the Ba’athists.  
 
In Libya, the formation of the single state by 1951 from what was previously Tripolitania in the 
west, Cyrenaica in the east and Fezzan in the southwest was only possible under duress, initially 
through Italian colonialism and later with British support. Oil (located in a way that prevented 
any one group claiming it for themselves alone) enabled the distribution of economic largesse 
to ease those tensions. Under Moammar Qadhafi a complex, chaotic blend of political 
accommodations and tyranny helped to secure the state itself.  
 
In each of these examples the power of the state was sufficient to manage or to contain, and in 
some cases to draw upon the potentially problematic aspects of traditional loyalties and 
identities. Since the outbreak of the Arab uprisings in late 2010 (and in the case of Iraq, since 
the overthrow of the Saddam regime in 2003) however, the paradigm has changed. Demands 
for a federal system have emerged in Libya, although the degree to which such demands and 
insistence on Berber, Tuareg, tribal and regional identity concerns represent bargaining points, 
rather than serious issues at a national level, is questionable. The assertion of Shia political 
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authority and Kurdish identity politics following the removal of the Saddam regime, the 
renewed contest between the Sunni and Shia for political power, the impact of events in Syria 
and contests over the rights to oil wealth and territorial control have renewed concern about the 
capacity of the Iraqi state to hold firmly together. In Egypt, the most serious issue is not so 
much a matter of demands for territorial separation as the challenge of establishing effective 
government authority in the Sinai, and dealing with Islamist movements questioning the values 
of the secular Arab state model, now once again under military control.   
 
The territorial integrity and sovereignty of Syria is of particular concern. The orientation of the 
Kurdish minority is affected not only by the civil war in Syria but also by developments in Iraq, 
where the growing separation of Kurdish areas from the remainder of that country and the 
strengthening of ties between the Kurds and Turkey will not easily be reversed. Although the 
Kurdish-dominated area of Syria would be difficult to defend if the Syrian government were to 
seek to re-establish its control there by military means, such a campaign would almost certainly 
also require the assistance of the Iraqi and Turkish governments in suppressing support for the 
Syrian Kurds from their sides of the border. Neither government has an inclination to do so at 
present. 
 
Barring the remote possibility of a sudden military reversal, it would seem unlikely that the 
Alawites of Syria will find themselves eventually having to defend merely a rump state –
‘Myanmar on the Mediterranean’. 23  However if the government’s territorial reach is 
nevertheless to be severely limited, and militia groups continue to have a significant impact at 
the popular level, the Druze and the Kurds are likely to seek to protect themselves by asserting 
more direct control over areas where their populations are mostly located. For the Kurds, 
significant interests in oil production are now also involved.24 Bedouin tribes on both sides of 
the Iraqi border may assume a larger role in protecting their interests against non-tribal forces, 
including jihadist elements. Iran and Hezbollah will continue to pursue their interests in Syria 
from Iraq and Lebanon without borders significantly constraining their activities.   
 
The upshot is that even if Syria’s borders, like those of other regional countries, may be 
expected to remain formally in place – and no regional government has shown any obvious 
interest in changing their borders, nor willingness to contemplate abrogating sovereignty within 
them – sovereignty will be increasingly difficult to enforce. In other words, although the Sykes-
Picot-based structure of national borders is unlikely to change significantly, on the ground over 
the next decade things are set to look very different.     
 
I t ’s  the Metaphor that Matters Most 
 
More rests under the rubric of the end of Sykes-Picot than the borders or territorial integrity of 
Arab states, although those issues are obviously significant. As mentioned, Sykes-Picot is also 
the metaphor for an era in which the values, and in some cases the lifestyles of significant 
elements of the Arab political economic and social elite were shaped. In some cases, those 
values and lifestyles were derived in large part from secular Western models of modernity 
closely associated with the colonial era in the Arab world.  
 
Limited engagement with Western technical and scientific advances was a feature of the 
Ottoman Empire from the early 18th century. Western imperial ambitions and interests had a 
profound impact on Egypt, Syria and Lebanon in the century that followed. Initially, at least, it 
was intended to be a selective, carefully circumscribed process on the Ottoman side, driven to a 
large extent by the need to be competitive in the military arena with Western powers. In the 
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case of the Albanian-origin dynasty established by Mohammad Ali in Egypt it was also meant to 
accrue economic benefits to the ruling elite.25 Rather than take on the complete Western 
package of technology, innovation and initiative, however, authoritarian rulers sought to ensure 
the barriers to Western cultural values infecting their societies remained firmly in place until 
well into the 19th century. 
 
The barriers, always porous, grew increasingly ineffectual. Recourse to minority groups (Greeks, 
Jews, Copts and Armenians) as the primary commercial and intellectual interface with Western 
countries gave those groups a privileged place, especially with the introduction, under pressure 
from imperial powers, of economic and other reforms in pursuit of their own commercial and 
other interests. In addition to the modernising effects of economic reforms and development, 
Lebanese Christians made major contributions to the emergence of Arab political 
consciousness 26  and to the awareness of Western culture. Imperial interventions which 
purported to guarantee the rights, and therefore the distinctiveness of particular religious 
groups (Maronites, Greek Orthodox and Jews); the intellectual influence of Western secular 
educational institutions such as the American University of Beirut, whose parent college was 
founded in 1866; the dominance of Western economic forces over local economies and the 
exposure of succeeding generations of impressionable young leaders to the seductive pleasures 
and achievements of Western societies, as well as scientific, technological and organisational 
advances ranging from urban planning to public infrastructure had a cumulative impact upon 
thinking at the elite level about what it meant to be ‘modern’.  
 
Though proudly nationalist, often paying a high personal price for their staunch opposition to 
the humiliation of an unequal and mostly conflictual relationship with colonial powers, and 
often despite resistance from traditionally-minded Muslim scholars (ulema), for many Arab 
reformists the conceptualisation of a Western brand of modernity therefore came to represent 
the benchmark against which they wished their societies, and their individual accomplishments, 
to be measured. In the words of Albert Hourani,  
 
The idea of Europe as the exemplar of modern civilization, which had animated the 
reforming governments of the (19th) century was powerful in these national movements. 
To be independent was to be accepted by the European states on a level of equality, to 
have the Capitulations, the legal privileges of foreign citizens, abolished, to be admitted 
to the League of Nations. To be modern was to have a political and social life similar to 
the countries of western Europe.27  
 
The overall impact, benefits and costs of colonial experience varied according to the particular 
brand of colonial control that was exercised, be it direct rule (as in the case of Algeria), indirect 
(as in Egypt, at least until the Anglo-Egyptian treaty arrangements of 1936) or under the guise of 
League of Nations mandate arrangements in Palestine, Syria and Iraq. Tribal and sectarian 
divisions were amplified in Iraq, Jordan and Syria by Western powers seeking to strengthen 
their capacity to shape outcomes in favour of their protégés and their own interests and 
objectives. The effects on Arab nationalism of decisions by colonial powers in regard to 
Palestine shaped perceptions of the West for generations that followed.  
 
The realities of coping and in some cases prospering within colonial frameworks produced 
their own effects on thinking about the desirable nature of Arab society. Arab elites took 
advantage of opportunities to acquire education and experience in Western environments. In 
some cases (notably among such figures as al-Afghani, Abduh and al-Banna), observation of, 
occasional engagement with and individual reaction to colonialism fostered a determination to 
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reaffirm the authenticity of Islamic culture as the bedrock of Arab society, and to seek to 
rejuvenate Islam to meet the challenges of colonial rule.  
 
Importantly, however, with the exception of reformists such as Abduh, few members of the 
post-colonial Arab elite political class lived “within the bounds of the sharia”28 or expressed 
their aspirations largely through an Islamic discourse. Thinking about nationalism before 1939 
was generally secularist and constitutionalist.29 Moreover those who under the influence of 
Western thinking were most active on such issues as gender reform – notably the remarkable 
Egyptian feminist, Huda Sha’rawi who led the way with the unveiling of women on her return 
from a women’s conference in Rome in 1923 – directly challenged traditional social values, 
including those of the Muslim community.  
 
The dominant political response to colonialism, which drew mainly from nationalist sentiment 
that eschewed Islamic symbolism and references, was essentially advocating normative 
arguments and values shared to some extent with progressive-minded Western leaders and 
intellectuals.  From the warmth with which Arab intellectuals welcomed the call for self-
determination for colonial peoples in US President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points 
outlined in 1918, to the editorials of the New Statesman of which Nasser was a devoted reader, 
much of Arab intellectual society hoped Western governments would be willing to match 
liberal sentiments with practical action. They were to be sorely disappointed by Western 
responses. But even in the aftermath of the colonial era, when newly-independent Arab 
leaderships were inclined in many cases to espouse values from the socialist side of the 
spectrum of Western thinking, Western models of modernity, both real and imagined, 
continued to have a disproportionate impact upon the notions of social progress envisaged by 
significant elements within Arab elites.  
 
Whatever their contribution to the ultimate emergence of a progressive Arab civil society, the 
values underpinning the colonial era rarely served Arab objectives. External players set the 
framework of national sovereignty, from borders to the privileged status of certain minorities, to 
serve their own purposes, hopes, fears and illusions about the Arab world.30 They preserved 
tribal structures and monarchies that many urbanised, educated, urban nationalist Arabs 
believed were outmoded. In Syria and Palestine they resolved Western political dilemmas and 
needs at the expense of Arab aspirations.  
 
Even when the colonial period had ended the actions of major Western powers humiliated 
rather than respected those aspirations. They believed their own needs and purposes – which 
they all too often represented to their domestic audiences and to each other as serving the 
interests of the international community or, in the Cold War era, the ‘free world’ – embodied a 
greater collective good than the interests and concerns of the Arabs. The latter, for the most 
part, had a very different interpretation of Western motives and behaviour.    
 
Whether or not in historical retrospect one considers the damage the Western countries did 
during the Sykes-Picot era was more enduring than the developmental benefits they brought to 
the Arab world, the (few) redemptory aspects of the colonial period are likely to be interred 
with its bones. Experience of colonialism vitiated its pretentions for many, whereas its most 
negative consequences (notably in regard to Israel and the Palestinians) look set to endure in 
popular imagination and collective memory.  
 
Little can be done to address the prism of pain and in some cases, xenophobia through which 
the relationship with Western countries is still viewed at the popular level in most of the Arab 
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world.31 The sense of historical injustice and betrayal by Western powers runs deep. Even at 
leadership level, any perceived association with the West on the part of domestic civil society 
actors carries connotations of political agendas that threaten to undermine the authority of 
governments already under siege over their economic and political performance.  
 
So far as dealing with the Western countries is concerned with the management of collective 
memories, real and imagined, and political mythologies in the Arab world is set to become 
more problematic. Among Islamists, especially, there is rejection of secular notions of 
modernity with their connotations of Western backing. Feelings of victimhood, shaped in large 
measure by the interpretation of history and values from an Islamic and nationalist perspective 
will support the reaffirmation of hazily-understood ‘authentic’ Arab values. 
 
Intel lectual and Cultural Expression and the Reshaping of Arab 
Society 
 
The dynamism of intellectual and cultural expression in the Arab world is deeply affected by 
this process because of the complex connection of Arab secular cultural forms and intellectual 
discourse to Arab society on one hand, and to global cultural influences and ideas on the other. 
Those connections and values are now being contested in ever more troubling ways, especially 
in Egypt, the Arab country which has long had a pre-eminent place in Arab cultural affairs. 
 
Historically one of the Arab world’s major strengths, Arab cultural expression has both reacted 
against and benefitted from the impact of colonialism and globalisation, providing sources of 
popular inspiration and pride in Arab cultural heritage in fields ranging from music to literature 
and the visual arts. It has provided sources of immense popular pleasure, especially in the 
realm of music and film as well as shaping the self-image of successive generations of the 
educated Arab elite.  
 
At the intellectual level, liberal European secular ideas and cultural values were prominent 
among the educated elite during Egypt’s late khedival and interwar period.32 Ernest Renan’s 
iconoclastic views on Islam challenged and sharpened the contribution of key Arab intellectuals 
to debates about religion and modernity.  Emile Durkheim strongly influenced Arab 
intellectual discourse, including in regard to notions of freedom and the role of the state.33 
French historian Francois Guizot deeply influenced the modernist Islamist thinker 
Mohammed Abduh’s reconstruction of Arab history and traditions, “negotiating modernity in 
the context of imperialism”.34 Arab elite culture also reflected to some extent a Mediterranean 
cultural and intellectual environment shaped by the large expatriate (mostly Greek, Italian and 
Jewish) presence, notably in Alexandria. 35   From the mid-19th century Europe influenced 
Egyptian middle class fashion, architecture, artistic expression, poetry and sport.36   
 
Cultural expression was also one of the rare devices through which the Arab world and 
Western intellectual circles had an occasional influence on each other: for example beneath 
romantic orientalist picture postcard scenes and images generated by Western artists and 
travellers lay a genuine interest on the part of significant contemporary Western artists such as 
Henri Matisse in the applique art generated by Egyptian tentmakers (khayamiyya). Interaction 
with Western customers and cultural traditions also helped to keep various traditional forms of 
Arab artisanship alive, creative and adaptable, including as a response to commercial 
competition and changing consumer tastes while remaining authentic as a genre.37  
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Political leaderships have always had some capacity to determine the boundaries of legitimate 
debate over societal values and behaviour, although with political considerations in mind they 
have rarely chosen to exercise that capability with much conviction. Under more authoritarian 
Arab regimes, including Iraq and Syria, nationalist themes and some crass examples of 
sycophantic, politically-inspired image-building were present in state-sponsored cultural works. 
But more importantly there was always in practice some latitude afforded to authentic artistic 
and cultural expression, especially where its more subversive elements were camouflaged with a 
degree of intellectual and political subtlety.  
 
Arabic literature, in particular, represented a key area in which intellectuals struggled to give 
expression to their concerns for deeper values imbued in Arab society, including rejection of 
injustice in all its forms, as well as pursuing the question of how Arab creativity could achieve its 
full potential in an era associated with dispossession, occupation and cultural appropriation. In 
the words of Ahmed Shboul, 
 
Arabic literature has been a witness and a participant in this age of Arab self-questioning, 
grief, protest, defiance, struggle and persistent hope. It is a literature of a culture in crisis, 
a culture trying to re-find itself, to be recognised, to be its potential self.38  
 
While certainly facing constraints from authoritarian regimes all too easily offended by 
evidence of independent thinking and commentary in any form, the principal points of 
pressure upon Egyptian writers, artists, film-makers and others concerned for intellectual 
freedom tended to come from the Islamist side of the political spectrum.39 In those quarters, 
concern to educate and instruct was deemed appropriate, but not the pursuit of critical enquiry 
or the depiction of immoral behaviour or imagery deemed to be erotic. Pressure was applied 
directly, in the form of harassment of prominent secular intellectuals critical of the Islamists, 
including the attempted assassination of Nobel Prize winning novelist Naguib Mahfouz in 1994, 
and the murder of the controversial liberal columnist Farag Fouda in 1992. There were 
ongoing insidious attempts by Islamists to denigrate the reputation of prominent academic, 
literary and other figures at odds with their views, including by bringing accusations of apostasy 
against them.40 Against that background it is not surprising that control of the institutions of 
government by those Islamists whose views of cultural expression are defined largely by their 
own agendas and negative ideological preconceptions (both political and cultural) of secularism 
was seen among the secular cultural elite as posing a significant risk to the sophistication of 
cosmopolitan Arab societies.41  
 
Although Islamists do not have a monopoly on iconoclasm in the Arab world, the neo-
traditionalist Islamist trend and the leadership style and values of the Muslim Brotherhood, like 
other Egyptian political and social institutions of long standing, are strongly hierarchical and 
authoritarian.42 The rejuvenation of Arab cultural expression in the aftermath of the uprisings 
will depend on whether political leaderships genuinely attach value to diversity rather than 
turning inward, and are prepared to defend and respect difference within Arab societies as part 
of the process. Their actions to date have suggested otherwise. 
 
The outrage among Salafist elements of the Islamist spectrum of Egyptian political opinion at 
art forms that have been accepted among the cosmopolitan Egyptian elite for over a century 
reflects deeper issues than prudish concern about nudity. As Nervana Mahmoud has cogently 
argued, the Islamist approach is based on four core concerns: an obligation for the state to 
uphold the building of a moral society; a perceived linkage between appearance and morality; 
the belief that success for political Islam requires ‘regaining Islamic morality within society’, and 
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deep disdain for Western artwork, ballet and sculpture (the last of which, she believes, also 
suffers from a misrepresentation of a hadith in which the Prophet warns that sculptors will be 
judged harshly on Judgement Day).43   
 
There will inevitably be a need to balance among wider political and policy priorities in 
government when formulating stances on issues of cultural and intellectual freedoms, which 
may cause Islamist political forces to reach accommodations in some areas of government 
policy with non-Islamist counterparts. However it remains too early to judge whether, and if so 
to what degree, the pursuit of such objectives may be allowed to cause a revision of their 
approach in the cultural sphere. Under the Morsy government in Egypt the issue of cultural 
expression was complicated by dealings between the various dimensions of the Muslim 
Brotherhood itself, since its organisational, parliamentary and executive aspects each represent 
distinct interests and constituencies. Since the removal of that government it remains to be seen 
what political balance will be struck between the Brotherhood and its Salafist rivals such as al-
Nour, on one hand, and its secular and Coptic counterparts on the other. Policy will of course 
be shaped to some extent by the mundane realities of politics: arrogance, fear and the political 
weight and strength of convictions of the Salafist and secular opponents and critics of the 
government on particular issues.  
 
For an Islamist-led or influenced government to depart, however, from the core concerns 
mentioned above would be to pose serious challenges to the ideology and distinctiveness of 
Islamist agendas instrumentalising religion for political advantage, as compared to the agendas 
of secular and leftist opponents and critics. There would also be very little likelihood of 
commensurate political reward among an overwhelmingly conservative electorate if the 
Islamists were seen to be obliging the narrow element within Arab societies that genuinely 
attaches a high priority to cultural and intellectual freedoms. The criticism most likely to 
resonate at the popular level would come from Salafist voices, rather than from the secular side 
of Egyptian politics and society.  
 
In short, under Islamist-dominated governments, especially in Egypt, Arab society is more 
likely to exploit possibilities for closing down creative space rather than widening it. 
 
Bringing Closure to Sykes-Picot:  The Arab World and the West 
Beyond 2011 
 
The tectonic plates of Arab society are shifting, amidst abundant evidence of social malaise, but 
there is no consensus at this point about the desirable direction of social change. Over a decade, 
possibly longer, the majority of Arab political systems can evolve, mainly through their own 
efforts, towards meeting a broad desire among young adults, both male and female, to be 
regarded as both Arab and modern. The capacity of civil society in Arab countries to harness 
the intellectual energy of a more empowered political audience and thereby to make further 
progress in terms of human security and economic development will improve if political 
leadership is effective. Social and political cohesion will be strengthened if both the formal 
aspects and the essential values of constitutionalism are promoted by Arab activists in the 
public sphere. In most cases, Arab political reform which manages to achieve a reasonable and 
inclusive balance between progress and stability will be part of the process of economic 
transformation, and vice versa.  
 
Recognising that potential for progress, however, is far from being confident that such an 
outcome will materialise. Especially in Egypt, if it were to be combined with ongoing political 
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and economic malaise, there is a real risk ultimately of failing to build strong and effective civil 
society institutions and a confident, progressive view of Arab modernity.  Not only Egyptians 
and most regional countries would suffer from the emergence of an even more alienated and 
marginalised younger generation of Egyptians. The capacity of leading Western countries to 
generate respect for their advocacy of democratic values for the Arab world of the 21st century 
would also be affected.  
 
For Western governments, a key challenge as this process unfolds is to find ways to construct 
relationships with their Arab counterparts that transcend a reading of history framed by the 
Sykes-Picot era that serves as a very important part of contemporary Arab identity. Western 
countries including donor countries have significant foreign policy and security interests at stake 
in the unfolding debate.  They would wish their values to be respected, and hopefully admired, 
in the emerging Arab world. For those reasons many Western governments will regard the 
battle of values in the Arab world as one in which they should be willing to engage.  
 
In the volatile political environment of the next few years, however, external parties seeking to 
participate in shaping an intricate, multidimensional playing field do so at their peril. More 
importantly, perhaps, they risk undermining the credibility and influence of those political 
actors within Arab countries who advocate the values most Western countries would wish to 
see prevail. External players are not being asked to shape developments in that context directly. 
Unless handled with extraordinary care and sensitivity to local conditions, attempts on their 
part to become involved on behalf of the Egyptian and other Arab activists with whom they 
have worked in the past, or with whom they sympathise at present, are more likely than not to 
generate resentment and unanticipated outcomes.  
 
Most Western countries would hope to see a conscious Arab political effort to build 
confidence in the prospect of achieving positive and constructive outcomes that engage Arab 
society with progressive, achievement-oriented world society. At the same time, Western 
governments will not easily find a durable balance between on the one hand the pursuit of their 
strategic interests in the region, a task which hinges in large part upon the quality of dealings 
with regional governments, rather than societies; and on the other hand the desire to uphold 
the values they regard as universal but which are not shared to the same degree at either the 
leadership or popular levels of Arab society.  
 
For Arab governments, the challenge is to find a politically sustainable balance between the 
need for Western assistance, especially financial support pending the restoration of political 
stability and economic growth; and meeting or at least managing the expectations and pressures 
of Western countries in regard to their domestic political, economic and foreign policy agendas. 
Many will seek support from the Gulf Arab states instead.  
 
So far as the contest of values within the Arab world about what it means to be Arab and 
modern is concerned, however, the most important consideration among Western countries 
should be to remain consistent in expressing their views on matters of principle; and to do no 
harm to the voices within the Arab world that continue advocating political reform, 
inclusiveness and constitutionality as core values of Arab society. If they are to change, the 
values of Arab society will have to be re-booted by those societies themselves. 
 
The Western objective should be as modest as the limited means available for its pursuit. The 
worst outcome would be the transformation of the debate about civilisational benchmarks and 
principles into a political contest at precisely the moment when battle has been joined between 
15 | P a g e  
 
reformists and Islamist neo-traditionalists to capture not only the space between state and 
society, but also the instrumental power of the state itself. Contests along those lines would 
inevitably be framed (however unconvincingly in the minds of outside observers) around 
questions of legitimacy, authenticity and sovereignty, while the gaps between Arab society and 
world society grow ever larger. That is a struggle which could only wind up serving the political 
interests of those most likely to stifle worthwhile reform and social progress. 
 
To contribute to achieving closure to Sykes-Picot from a Western perspective will require 
renewed focus on engagement aimed at increasing Arab and Western exposure to the 
experience and aspirations of each other through strengthened institutional interaction, people 
to people contact, commercial, scientific and technical cooperation. By any measure, 
engagement with Arab society by Western countries has lagged well behind programmes with 
countries arguably of lesser significance to the future of the Arab world and Western interests 
in that context and beyond. There were, for example, only around 2,000 Egyptians studying in 
the United States in 2011, compared to more than double that number from Kenya, and 
almost 10,000 Nepalese and 100,000 Chinese students.44  Egypt is not among the top 20 
recipients of US economic aid, and Western development assistance to Egypt is at risk of 
declining. 
 
Over-generous funding of Arab civil society organisations and partner agencies is not the 
answer to fostering new values either – even if such funding were permitted by Arab 
governments suspicious of the motives behind such programmes. But helping to strengthen 
basic capacities in such as areas as health, nutrition, water management, agricultural research 
and business management, including in some cases through cooperation with Arab and other 
multilateral development assistance programmes, will foster the conditions under which Arab 
governments may, in due course, address those issues themselves. And by increasing the 
positive and constructive exposure of Arab civil servants, educators, intellectuals and other 
opinion-shapers to the values and behaviour of a wider range of Westerners beyond the often 
tawdry imagery of the tourism sector, let alone the collective memories of the colonial era, a 
more balanced appreciation of respective strengths, weaknesses and aspirations may develop 
on all sides.  
 
Empowerment of Arab audiences, in Egypt and elsewhere, presents both risks and 
opportunities for the pursuit of Western interests. It is instructive to note that in the turmoil in 
Egypt in mid-2013 both supporters and opponents of the government bitterly denounced the 
United States: indeed, underlining the enduring power of the colonial metaphor, one leading 
Egyptian liberal commentator saw fit to describe the US ambassador as ‘the American version 
of Lord Cromer’, the British Controller-General and later Consul-General in Egypt from 1883 
to 1907.45 It demands still greater effort to advocate, educate and instil confidence in audiences 
which have long had reason to be sceptical of the agendas and purported values of external 
parties linked to the former regimes. Balance and moderation in foreign policy choices, 
dialogue and continuing effort to address regional tensions can only work to the advantage of 
those advocating liberal democratic values within Arab society. 
 
Conclusion 
 
If the end of Sykes-Picot means anything, it marks the beginning of the establishment of a new 
set of benchmarks for what it means to be both Arab and modern, to replace a model whose 
authenticity and whose relevance to the expectations of contemporary Arab society is 
increasingly in question.  
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Arab reformists during the colonial era sought changes but mostly lacked the political skills, 
backing and commitment to shape values and behaviour on issues beyond their own social 
strata. In the post-colonial era and even during the last decade their experience was not notably 
different. The reluctance of authoritarian Arab leaders who inherited the institutions of the 
colonial period to cede power, initially while pursuing a nationalist vision and subsequently 
amidst the seductive and corrosive effects of power itself, effectively ensured stasis. Although 
states gained a degree of strength through the role of the leader, in most respects primordial 
loyalties remained stronger than the institutions of the state. The Arab uprisings that have 
weakened the authority of states have highlighted the dilemmas arising from that situation.  
 
Closure to the metaphorical Sykes-Picot era is long overdue. The way forward demands a 
process, embedded in transparent, inclusive institutions, of establishing a new and broadly-
accepted paradigm of Arab modernity in support of which the energy and resources of leaders, 
state and society can be directed.  
 
The future, however, is clouded by uncertainty. Authoritarian models, relying mostly on 
electoral outcomes or military interventions to defend the authority of governments to 
determine political directions or even to dictate social values, while those same governments 
fail to protect the most basic freedoms of their own citizens against bigotry and xenophobia, will 
not widen the space for intellectual creativity and social progress. Nor does Western 
intervention with its attendant risks of reinforcing the fractures and political mythologies of the 
Arab world provide an answer. Arab states have to find their own pathways to be both 
accountable and refreshed if the creative potential of their citizens is to be realised.  
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